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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900218-CA 
Priority No. 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the search in this case was a warrantless search, 
it was the State's burden to justify it. The State failed to meet 
this burden. 
This Court should reach the merits of the issues raised by 
Mr. Velasquez and reverse the trial court's order denying the motion 
to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE FAILED IN ITS 
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL BURDEN 
TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
IN THIS CASE. 
In response to Mr. Velasquez's contentions that the stop, 
search, and seizure were pretextual and violated Mr. Velasquez's 
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution, the State argues that Mr. Velasquez 
waived all of these issues. Appellee's brief at 1 through 13. The 
State concludes that this Court should either affirm the trial 
court's ruling or remand this case for rehearing of the impound and 
inventory issues. Appellee's brief at 13. 
A. IT WAS THE STATE'S SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL 
DUTY TO JUSTIFY WARRANTLESS SEARCHES. 
It was the State's burden of proof to justify the 
warrantless search by showing that it falls within an exception to 
the warrant requirement. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 
1990). Burdens of proof are not merely substantive, but encompass 
procedural responsibilities as well. As the court explained in 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company, §59 P.2d 1040 
(Utah 1983), 
For a question to be considered on appeal, the 
record must clearly show that it was timely 
presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot 
merely assume that it was properly raised. The 
burden is on the parties to make certciin that the 
record they compile will adequately preserve 
their arguments for review in the event of an 
appeal. 
Id. at 1045 (citations omitted). 
At trial, the prosecutor noted the State's burden to 
justify the warrantless search, and voiced appreciation for 
Mr. Velasquez's pretrial motion to suppress, stating, 
Although it is Mr. Valdez's motion, there is no 
search warrant here. It is my understanding it 
is our burden to go forward. I would compliment 
Mr. Valdez on one of the points that I have been 
taking irritation with over the past several 
years. He has made specific allegations in here 
rather than the boilerplate motion, and we would 
call Officer Hedenstrom to the stand. 
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(T. 2). 
Because it was the State's burden to justify the 
warrantless search, the State's arguments that defense counsel 
waived the issues briefed in Mr. Velasquez's appeal have 
questionable legal relevance. 
As a factual matter, however, defense counsel brought to 
the trial court's attention every issue presented by Mr. Velasquez 
on appeal, except for whether the subjective intent of a police 
officer should be explicitly recognized as a pertinent consideration 
in pretext cases under Article I section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution.^ 
1. The absence of the state constitutional argument may be 
explained by the fact that this case was heard on March 20 and 22, 
1990, before the filing of the State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
May 30, 1990), decision giving an independent interpretation of the 
Utah Constitution's search and seizure provision. See State v. 
Hargraves, case number 890684-CA, slip opinion at 5 (Utah Ct. App. 
Feb. 7, 1991)(this Court addressed search and seizure issue for the 
first time on appeal because the case was heard prior to the filing 
of a determinative decision by the Utah Supreme Court). As noted in 
Appellant's opening brief, the Larocco decision departs from the 
federal line of cases by making exclusion of evidence "a necessary 
consequence of police violations of article I section 14," id. at 
25. Thus the evidence of an officer's subjective state of mind is 
not limited in relevance to the exclusion question under Utah law, 
as it is under the federal case law. See brief of Appellant at 
15-16, discussing Larocco and Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128 
(1978). 
The State argues that as a policy matter, objective 
standards are preferable to subjective inquiries, because objective 
standards supposedly facilitate "evenhanded law enforcement." 
Appellee's brief at 6. This policy argument should be compared with 
a countervailing one explained by reference to State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in which the Utah Supreme Court recognized in 
the context of consent searches that ignoring government misconduct 
(footnote continues) 
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At the pretrial motion to suppress, defense counsel cited 
Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution, and specifically noted 
that the search was warrantless and the stop was pretextual 
(R. 25). At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel 
referred to South Dakota v, Opperman, 428 U.S. 328 (1976), and 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App.), limited, 796 P.2d 689 
(Utah 1990), providing the court with a copy of Sierra and asking 
the court to read the cases prior to ruling on the motion (T. 15). 
Defense counsel noted that the State had failed to present adequate 
proof that the search was an inventory search, and brought the 
court's attention to the pretext issue as follows, 
In addition to that, Judge, the other thing 
is to, and you will see that in the State v. 
Sierra, they have indicated, yes, a police 
officer may however stop an automobile for a 
traffic violation committed in the officer's 
presence. Well, it had two different plates on 
it, although it was properly registered. 
But it goes on to say in Sierra on page 977: 
"It is impermissible for law enforcement officers 
to use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to 
search for evidence of a more serious crime.11 
(footnote 1 continued) 
defeats the two purposes of the federal exclusionary rule—deterring 
misconduct by law enforcement and preventing courts from 
participating in the violation of rights against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. See id. at 16. Focusing on objective 
standards of reasonableness in pretext cases and ignoring evidence 
of subjective intent encourages police misconduct by glossing over 
it. By leaving courts to hypothesize explanations for search and 
seizure violations, a strictly objective standard may involve courts 
in perpetuating those violations. See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 
460, 473 (Utah 1990)(purposes of Utah exclusionary rule are open to 
interpretation). 
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It is our position that that is what occurred 
here, Judge, and the items that were found ought to 
be suppressed. 
(T. 17-18). 
The prosecutor acknowledged and disputed defense counsels 
contention that the stop was pretextual and argued that the search 
was a proper inventory search (T. 15-16, 20). 
The trial court apparently recognized the general 
reasonable suspicion/hypothetical officer test frequently applied in 
pretext cases: 
THE COURT: We have a car with different 
license plates. We have the officer not 
remembering if there was a registration or not. 
We have the defendant without a driver's license, 
and so what would the reasonable officer do if he 
pulls anyone over at that point? I haven't heard 
anything. If he hadn't had a registration, then 
it certainly would have been justified to impound 
the car. You don't know if it is stolen, or you 
don't know what the story is. 
MR. LEMKE: Or if the driver was under arrest, 
Your Honor, and there was no one else there that 
could drive the car away 
THE COURT: The problem I have with that, is 
everyone that is driving a car without a driver's 
license arrested and taken to jail? That is kind 
of—Maybe they ought to be, but I am kind of 
shocked why—What's the circumstances here? 
There has to be something articulable. 
(T. 20-21). 
In light of the State's procedural and substantive burden 
to justify the warrantless search, and the record in this case, this 
Court should disregard the State's arguments that Mr. Velasquez 
waived all of the issues raised on appeal, and should reject the 
State's intimation that this Court should remand this case to the 
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trial court so that the prosecution can take a second bite at the 
apple, 
B. THE STATE FAILED TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH. 
The State's discussion of the merits of this case appears 
in part of footnote 7, as follows: 
Notwithstanding the above, should this Court 
look past defendant's waiver to address the 
merits of this case based on the record currently 
before it, the State acknowledges that Officer 
Hedenstrom's conclusory testimony alone may be 
insufficient for this Court to determine whether 
the inventory was conducted pursuant to 
"established reasonable procedures." 
Appellee's brief at 12. 
Officer Hedenstrom's testimony not only fails to provide 
necessary details showing that the warrantless search in this case 
fell within the "inventory search" exception to the warrant 
requirement, but also provides the detail necessary to show that the 
warrantless search in this case cannot be justified as an inventory 
search. Officer Hedenstrom testified that one of the purposes of 
the inventory search was to gather "any evidence" (T. 6, 14). As 
the court noted in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), "the 
inventory exception does not apply when the inventory is merely a 
'pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.'" Id. at 
267-268 (citation omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
The State failed to justify the warrantless search, and 
Mr. Velasquez is entitled to an order reversing the trial court's 
order denying his motion to suppress. 
Respectfully submitted this (&£ day of March, 
1991. 
/JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Mr. Velasquez 
|W 
ELIZABETH "HpisRDOK 
Attorney for\Mr. Velasquez 
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